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Organizational and managerial theories of modularity applied to the design and produc-
tion of complex artifacts are used to interpret the rise and success of Free/Open Source
software methodologies and practices in software engineering. Strengths and risks of the
adoption of a modular approach in software project management are introduced and are re-
lated to the achievements of various Free/Open Source Software projects (among them: the
GNU operating system, the Linux kernel, the HURD kernel). It is suggested that mindful
implementation of the principles of modularity may improve the rate of success of many
Free/Open Source software projects. Speciﬁc case studies here depicted, as well as indirect
observation of common programming practices employed by Free/Open Source developers
and users, suggest a possible revision towards an improved theory of modularity that may
be extended also to settings different from software production.
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Introduction
The popularity of the GNU/Linux operating system has conveyed increasing attention to
the Free/Open Source Software (F/OSS) development model, usually described as a
radically different system of rules, practices, and methodologies, shared within a large and
virtually distributed software developers community, alternative to proprietary and closed
development techniques employed by traditional hierarchical organizations in the software
industry (Raymond, 1999; Kogut and Metiu, 2001; Feller and Fitzgerald, 2000).
A growing number of studies has analyzed the F/OSS movement, from a variety of
perspectives, aimed to understand the bases of such successful phenomenon.1 Our study
1Theoretical and empirical analyses of motivational (Hertel and Herrmann, 2003; Zeitlyn, 2003), cul-
tural (Lancashire, 2001), organizational (Kuwabara, 2000; Tuomi, 2001; Moon and Sproull, 2000), economic
(Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003) dimensions of F/OSS have been developed by large
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offers a complementary analysis of the design and the development of F/OSS in terms of a
theory of modularity.
Modularity, which from the perspective of management scholars can still be regarded as
an innovative manufacturing paradigm for the design and the production of complex
artifacts (Schilling, 2000), is a key element in explaining the development and the success
of many F/OSS projects, since it offers a comprehensive explanation of many key issues
such as how division of labor takes place between developers, how coordination is
achieved, how code testing and integration is deployed and how innovation occurs.
Our reconsideration of the accounts of GNU/Linux and other F/OSS projects highlights
how they beneﬁted from the typical advantages of implementing modular architectures
(e.g. fast speed of development, recombination of modules, innovation through projects
competition, reuse of previously developed code (Hatch, 2001; Jackson, 1998; Feller and
Fitzgerald, 2000)), while, at the same time, many critical pitfalls typically related to
managing modularity (the architectural design of modules and interfaces) were avoided.
Let us summarize three interrelated strategies, or design shortcuts, that appear to have
been particularly effective in this respect.
First of all, the architectural guidelines of many complex systems were clearly inherited
from previously existing modular software projects (see, for instance, the GNU project
and the FreeBSD project, closely resembling the UNIX architecture). By imitating a
well–established architecture, developers were able to avoid the problems related to
designing modular architectures from scratch, namely, devising a decomposition of the
whole system in independent sub–parts, or modules (as we will see further on, this is not a
trivial task).
Secondly, when devising modular architectures that are considerably innovative, so that it
is not possible to rely on blueprints of existing software, another design shortcut is to
think of modularity not in terms of a static and ex–ante design principle but, rather, as a
dynamic activity of problem solving that starts from fairly interconnected architectures,MODULAR DESIGN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEX ARTIFACTS 4
that are repeatedly ﬁne–tuned and reworked, leading over time to more modular outcomes
(“evolving modularization”). In this respect, we found it useful to analyze the evolution of
the GNU/Linux kernel. Conversely, pursuing full modularity from the beginning may be
very risky, and may eventually lead to serious difﬁculties (as in the case of the
development of the HURD microkernel).
Finally, F/OSS development style seems to suggest a third effective design shortcut.
While traditionally information hiding has been viewed as the key principle guiding both
the design and the implementation of modular software artifacts, F/OSS seems to
substantially disregard this principle at the implementation level. For instance, empirical
evidence shows that F/OSS developers systematically improve parts of the project they are
working on by tinkering with the code of multiple modules, taking advantage of the
source availability and of the absence of code ownership.
Our account on how the principles of modular design have been originally adapted by
F/OSS development allows us to move away from the stereotypical deﬁnition of
modularity. As a matter of fact, while it is more and more often proposed as a
fundamental paradigm for the design and production of artifacts (Baldwin and Clark,
2000), it is still regarded by some authors as a black box (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001;
Devetag and Zaninotto, 2001). The empirical domain of F/OSS allows to shed some light
on many critical issues related to modularity. Among them: (i) the design of modular
architecture viewed as a complex activity of problem solving, (ii) the relationships
between organizational structure and architecture design in modular projects, (iii) how
modularity copes with unforeseen interdependencies.
Our examination is based on published and unpublished data: interviews and papers
written by key actors, analyses developed by scholars and quite a large mass of original
documents made available through Internet websites.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys some of the most relevant topics of
modularity in management and organization science. Then, it turns to softwareMODULAR DESIGN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEX ARTIFACTS 5
development, characterizing modularity as one of the fundamental topic in the software
engineering debate. In Section 3, the F/OSS development is interpreted through the lens
of the theory of complex modular system. We summarize the accounts of speciﬁc projects
and we advance some stylized facts of F/OSS development. Finally, Section 4 sketches
some reﬂections on how F/OSS methodologies and practices may fully beneﬁt from
employing a mindful modular approach to the design and implementation of complex
software projects, and suggests how the peculiar implementation of the principles of
modularity shown by F/OSS may help in reﬁning both existing theories of modularity, and
their practical application to domains different from software production.
Modularity
Modularity has been receiving an increasing amount of attention in a variety of ﬁelds,
from neuroscience and artiﬁcial intelligence to architecture, urban design and
management (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Nowadays a modular approach is applied to
complex projects in R&D, industrial manufacturing and software engineering, and
modularity has been assumed as a key–concept in the design and production of a great
number of artifacts, both physical, like buildings, cars, furniture, and immaterial ones, like
software (Schilling, 2000).
This interdisciplinary interest is largely due to the fact that modularity is regarded as a
general property of complex systems, pertaining to the degree of decomposability of a
system in loosely coupled sub–parts made by tightly coupled components. Literature on
modularity emphasizes the importance of structures and relationships, and the outlined
models all rely on an underlying system theory that provides a comprehensive framework
for understanding and pertinently describes the speciﬁc object of study (artifacts, objects,
machines, tasks, molecules, spaces, projects, etc.). A modular system is thus represented
as a complex of components or sub–systems, where designers try to minimize and
standardize the interdependencies among modules. As a matter of fact, speculations aboutMODULAR DESIGN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEX ARTIFACTS 6
modularity in management science are addressed to both production (Baldwin and Clark,
2000; Langlois, 2002) and product (Ulrich, 1995; Schilling, 2000) domains.
Herbert Simon’s inﬂuence in the way modularity has been conceived is particularly
evident. First of all, modularity is often introduced within a problem solving framework
and modular design is regarded as a solution to cope with uncertainty and variability.
Second, as in Simon’s analysis of the artiﬁcial, modularity in complex systems regards
both goals and hierarchies. Third, modular solutions are based on problem decomposition;
fourth, since complex systems are not quite entirely decomposable, modular design
eventually needs to deal with residual interdependencies (Simon, 1981).
Modularity in management and organization science
In management and organization science literature, modularity has been introduced as an
innovative paradigm for ﬁrm manufacturing (Ulrich, 1995; Schilling, 2000), organization
design (Baldwin and Clark, 2000) and for a general theory of the ﬁrm (Langlois, 2002).
Modularity provides relevant advantages that have been neatly identiﬁed in the literature.
Modularity allows for product variety that is obtained by a recombination (mix and match)
of components (Langlois and Robertson, 1992). Modularity is viewed as a base for
differentiation strategies: ﬁrms may enrich their products catalog and adapt to customers’
needs with limited additional costs (Camuffo, 2002). Moreover, modularity has also a
great impact on production processes as it positively affects ﬂexibility, division of labor
and specialization (Devetag and Zaninotto, 2001).
According to Baldwin and Clark (2000), modularity in production systems is obtained by
following some general rules, originally drawn from computer science and software
development, concerning two different categories of information: visible and hidden
information. Modular systems design needs to specify only the visible rules, namely the
information about: (a) the deﬁnition of the architecture, (b) interfaces speciﬁcations and
(c) modules integration tests. The inner description of each module and how it works are
hidden from outside: it does not need to be deﬁned ex–ante or communicated during theMODULAR DESIGN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEX ARTIFACTS 7
process, since modules interactions exclusively follow the rules speciﬁed by the interfaces
parameters.
Unfortunately, this neat description of modular design sometimes does not succeed; most
of the times, after the integration of the independently developed modules, inconsistencies
come up and the system does not work properly. The most common reason for this failure
is that the decomposition of a complex system is not at all a trivial business. Most of the
times, the activities of decomposition are suboptimal and result, at their best, in a
quasi–decomposable architecture, where some degree of interdependency between
modules is still at work. As we will see in the next Subsection, residual and unforeseen
interdependencies seem to be particularly relevant in the production of software artifacts.
Modularity in software development
The “power of modularity” in software engineering.
The notion of modularity is central in the design and production of software artifacts,
especially for large and complex projects. Since the early days of software engineering the
issue of designing, developing, testing and releasing a large software project brought into
discussion the trade–off between simplicity and speed of development. The dilemma that
software engineers were facing is, in the words of Brooks (1975), the following one:
“For efﬁciency and conceptual integrity, one prefers a few good minds doing design and
construction. Yet for large systems one wants a way to bring considerable manpower to
bear, so that the product can make a timely appearance. How can these two needs be
reconciled?”
Frederick Brooks, the author of one of the most inﬂuential software project management
handbooks, clearly recognized that small sharp teams performed better than large ones,
but they were not sufﬁciently staffed to deliver large software projects under schedule
pressure. Conversely, while larger teams potentially increased the pace of the development
process, they also resulted in an overwhelming need for coordination of individual efforts
and in diminishing marginal returns of manpower on productivity (also known, in theMODULAR DESIGN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEX ARTIFACTS 8
extreme case of negative marginal returns, as the “Brooks’ Law”). As a result, efﬁciency
and conceptual integrity of the whole project were at risk, since men and months where
not fully interchangeable units in the decision of dimensioning and stafﬁng of a project.
Efﬁcient software engineering methodologies are meant to solve this fundamental
trade–off between task partition and division of labor, on the one hand, and coordination
and communication costs, on the other one. Brooks’ recipe for coping with the design and
the production of complex software was to vertically divide labor in order to separate
high–level activities as much as possible (such as the design of a software artifact) from
lower ones (such as the implementation of code). As a result, even a large software project
might have been guided by a small number of architectural designers, hence reducing
coordination and communication costs needed to conceive the architectural blueprint of
the project. A second related element in Brook’s recipe was then to assign the
implementation of each part of the project to small and focused teams (the so called
“surgical team”).
In terms of a modern theory of modularity, the basic assumption inside Brook’s seminal
work is that large software projects are integral and non–decomposable systems, where
interactions among parts are nontrivial and generate high communication and
coordination needs. Vertical division of labor is viewed as the way to avoid as much as
possible these inefﬁciencies by concentrating design and architectural activities on few
heads. What is clearly overlooked from Brook’s perspective is that interdependencies may
not only be considered as given constraints, but rather they may be strongly reduced at the
architectural design level, by effectively decomposing the complex system in
quasi–independent subparts.
As a matter of fact, the introduction of a fully modular approach in modern software
engineering methodologies has been fostered by the recognition that the degree of
interdependencies may be strongly reduced if a complex software project can be
decomposed in independent subparts, that is, dividing the whole project in smallerMODULAR DESIGN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEX ARTIFACTS 9
components that are loosely coupled and highly independent on each other (von Hippel,
1990; Langlois, 2002). Hence, when subparts are almost independent, it is possible to
divide labor minimizing the risk of coordination failures.
Conceiving the design of a complex software artifact as a modular system means to apply
the basic principle of “information hiding”, originally developed by Parnas (1972), that
prescribes treating software modules as opaque entities, whose relevant information is
only available to its inner programmer, while not being accessible to external
programmers. Here the only information revealed is embedded in the interfaces, while the
information regarding the design and how the module works is not communicated.
Nowadays, the widespread adoption of object oriented languages and the diffusion of
component based development as well other popular trends in software engineering seem
to have afﬁrmed at large this information hiding principle and the paradigm of modularity
as common software practices, aimed at speeding up the development process.
Consider, for instance, the case of the development of Microsoft Internet Explorer 3.0,
Microsoft ﬁrst internally developed Internet browser, that hit ﬁnal product release less
than nine months after the design of the ﬁrst initial speciﬁcations.
As one developers described it:
“We had a large number of people who would have to work in parallel to meet the target
ship date. We therefore had to develop an architecture where we could have separate
component teams feed into the product. [...] In fact if someone asked what the most
successful aspect of IE3 was, I would say it was the job we did in ‘componentizing’ the
product.”2
The above discussion seems to push modularity and information hiding as the landmark
principles for combining concerns of size and division of labor with high speed of
development of a software project. Nevertheless, the“dark side” of modularity, namely the
pitfalls of system integration and testing of modular design, seems to be particularly
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substantial in the ﬁeld of software artifacts.
Modularity as a complex design activity: managing unforeseen interdependencies in
software modules.
A software product architecture may be deﬁned as a mapping of required functions of the
product in functional components. The system as a whole is decomposed in a set of
functional modules whose interactions provide the overall functionality of the system
(Ulrich, 1995; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). As in the case of hardware artifacts, one has
to determine not only how to divide the whole system in subparts, and how to assign
functional requirements to subparts, but also how any component has to communicate and
interact with every other component in the architecture (Sanchez, 2000).
When it comes to the topic of component interactions, software seems to be a particular
artifact with respect to physical artifacts, since components interface speciﬁcation,
deﬁning interactions between modules, result in system of less rigid constraints in the case
of software artifacts. In particular, physically speciﬁcations on how one component has to
be connected to the other ones (attachment interfaces3), spatial, volume, weight
constraints of a component (spatial interfaces) and other environmental interactions
pertaining the generation of heat, vibrations, magnetic ﬁelds bearing consequences to
other components (environmental interfaces), clearly do not apply to the case of software
modules.
Then, at a ﬁrst sight, it may be reasonable to expect that, given the existence of fewer
sources of components interactions, designing and developing loosely coupled software
artifacts would be easier than the case of hardware products such as standard physically
assembled goods.
On the contrary, both software engineering literature (Brooks, 1975; Pressman, 2000;
Schach, 2002) and empirical case studies of software product development (Glass, 1997;
Solheim and Rowland, 1993) suggest that integrating software components may be harder
3We follow the taxonomy introduced by Sanchez (2000).MODULAR DESIGN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEX ARTIFACTS 11
than assembling hardware artifacts.
Brooks’ famous essay on the difﬁculties of software engineering techniques in granting
improvements in productivity, reliability and simplicity in developing software programs,
may support us in reﬁning our explanations of why integrating software modules and thus
producing modular software may be difﬁcult (Brooks, 1986). The author speculates on the
fundamental properties of software entities that may account for the difﬁculties in
separating interdependencies and decompose large software projects: software entities
differ from physical artifacts for their highly nonlinear complexity, leading to the
impossibility of enumerating (not to mention understanding) all the possible states of a
program. As the size of a software project increases, it becomes more and more difﬁcult to
decompose interdependencies and to design an architecture that preserves the initial
conceptual integrity of the software project by a combination of loosely coupled
functional software components. Moreover, software is invisible. The same intangible
attributes that seem to free software entities from standard physical constraints that
hardware ones have to satisfy, seem at the same time to affect human abilities of
anticipating correctly component interface speciﬁcations and interdependencies. While
geometric abstraction are powerful tools that may help the architectural design for
assembly goods (“Contradictions become obvious, omissions can be caught.” (Brooks,
1986)), similar geometrical representations do not help much during the design phase of
software structures because source of interdependencies are more subtle, not visible, and
related to a series of elements (“ﬂow of control, ﬂow of data, patterns of dependency, time
sequence, name–space relationships” (Brooks, 1986)) whose interrelations may be only
partially caught by diagrams and ﬂow charts.
As a consequence, the process of modular software design tends to be a faulty one, where
testing, debugging and integration phases may be much more relevant in terms of
resources needed when compared to the production of physical artifacts. This is largely
due to two intertwined aspects: (a) designers are boundedly rational decision makersMODULAR DESIGN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEX ARTIFACTS 12
(Simon, 1957) and (b) the nature of interdependencies between modules is mainly
multidimensional and invisible. As a result, the act of decomposing a large software
project into components is an activity that results, at its best, in a suboptimal outcome:
some sources of interdependencies are well determined and taken into account in the
design of components and interfaces, while others are not. In some sense, even careful
decomposition of large software projects tends to be accomplished making trade–offs
between sources of interdependencies, recognizing the more visible ones and disregarding
the less evident or less important ones. These reasons, combined with the huge size of
large software project, account for the difﬁculties in the subsequent integration – testing –
assembly phases. Likewise, less careful decomposition results in even greater problems at
the ﬁnal stages of code integration.
In the following, we will discuss how F/OSS style of development has beneﬁted from
adapting the paradigm of modularity. In particular, we will try to highlight and to relate
success or failure of speciﬁc projects to advantages and strengths of modularity, on the
one side, and to risks, pitfalls and drawbacks of modularity on the other hand.
Furthermore, we will describe how F/OSS practices and methodologies represent an
improved characterization of the paradigm of modular software production, where the
information hiding principle is invoked at the design level, while it is later disregarded, at
the implementation level, since all the available information is effectively used in order to
speed up the production process, taking advantage of what Brooks originally deﬁned
“programming as a public process”.
Modularity in F/OSS development
Imitating a previously existing design
Modular design of complex systems is a demanding job since all the modules interfaces
have to be deﬁned ex-ante. How can designers cope with such degrees of complexities?
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take advantage of existing templates, rather than to develop a brand new project from
scratch. The Free Software Foundation (FSF) GNU project and the FreeBSD operating
system project are two relevant instances of this approach to the modular design of
complex artifacts, as their kinship with UNIX operating system is openly recognized.
UNIX operating system was a milestone in the computer software history and it is usually
described as a highly modular, scalable and portable platform (Ritchie and Thompson,
1974; Gancarz, 1994). The UNIX architecture is a complex and massively decomposed
architecture of independent modules, characterized by high specialization of programs
(“programs that do one thing and do it well”), working together by means of structures,
“pipes”4, and sharing as a fundamental interface of communication text streams (also
known as the “UNIX philosophy” as formulated by Douglas McIlroy, the inventor of
pipes (Salus, 1994)). UNIX was the ﬁrst modern operating system not developed using a
hardware dependent assembly language. The kernel was written in C, ensuring portability
to various hardware platforms (Johnson and Ritchie, 1978; Miller, 1978).5
UNIX highly modular architecture had strong consequences both at the level of
developers coding activities and at the level of users’ experience. Developers were able,
thanks to its modular design, to carry out development of speciﬁc parts of the system in
autonomy and without any need to coordinate their efforts with other sub–projects.
Modularity allowed for both parallel development and contribution of new components;
furthermore, the overall design of the system was signiﬁcantly improved by the
development of innovative modules and competition between similar projects (Baldwin
and Clark, 2000). At the end–user level, modularity invited mere users to employ mix and
match strategies (recombination of different modules), allowing them to generate a wide
4By pipe technology it is possible to connect the output of one program to the input of another one, and
therefore to execute complex tasks by sequences of elementary programs linked together
5As originally noted by Baldwin and Clark (2000), another interesting feature of UNIX is represented by
being modular not only at the architectural level (static design modularity) but also in the way, as an operating
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variety of different implementations of the operating system where a large part of the
modules pertaining to the user space were highly customizable and were chosen according
to speciﬁc tastes or needs.
Even through this rather short and incomplete account of the early days of UNIX
hackerdom, the past arguments should suggest that many of the elements pertaining to the
decentralized and spontaneous nature of Linux development process are not as innovative
and original as many Linux advocates often underline. They are rather mostly inherited
from Linux direct ancestor, the UNIX operating system (McConnell, 1999). Strangely
enough, this almost self evident argument seems to be mysteriously overlooked in many
popular contributions to the Linux debate.
The GNU project, started in 1984 by Richard Stallman, represented at its beginning a
titanic effort to offer a free alternative to currently existing commercial and proprietary
operating systems. In this respect, Stallman’s design strategy consisted in cloning an
already existing project, a stable and mature architecture that had been originally
conceived around ﬁfteen years before. As suggested by Rosenberg (2000):
“Stallman says that he chose UNIX as his model because that way he would not have to
make any design decisions.”
As a matter of fact, the whole GNU project represented the attempt to recreate the
pre–AT&T UNIX arcadic era, where the original architecture was preserved in essence
and only some limited and marginal reworking in the design took place, in order to solve
some minor technical disadvantages of UNIX (e.g. the introduction of 32–bit support).
This architectural choice followed by Stallman, and later widely adopted by the hacker
community, has been a conservative one. A more risky option such as undertaking a
radically innovative project based on the design of a new architecture was disregarded in
favor of a safe and well known alternative.
FreeBSD is another important operating system that deliberately mimicked the
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the community spent its attention on incremental development, rather than on design
discussions (Jorgensen, 2001). To conceive a new operating system characterized by a
modular architecture is a challenging cognitive activity of modules and interfaces
deﬁnition. First, the designer needs to conceive a system of modules, by decomposing the
whole system in quasi-independent components. Second, failures in the decomposition
phase results in extra costs for ﬁne–tuning and ﬁxing activities aimed at solving
unexpected and unforeseen interdependencies.
In this respect, the FSF and the FreeBSD community were able to consciously handle
what, through the lens of the theory of modularity, is a fundamental trade–off between
threats at the design level and opportunities at the implementation level. As a result, the
decision of establishing the GNU and the FreeBSD projects upon a stable, mature and
carefully modularized architecture was the key element to beneﬁt from the typical
advantages of modularity (concurrent engineering, division of labor, decentralized
development, innovation via module based evolutionary dynamics, and much more), while
at the same time avoiding the classic pitfalls and drawbacks of modularity, concerning the
risks of imperfect decomposition in the design of an innovative modular architecture as
the backbone for the project.6
Horizontal division of labor, task interdependencies and Brooks’ Law
The perspective of modularity seems also to offer other different interpretations
contrasting many other recurring stereotypes in the debate over the revolutionary nature of
F/OSS development.
One of the most criticized principles of the otherwise seminal and evocative essay The
Cathedral and the Bazaar (Raymond, 1999) is the one preﬁguring the demise of Brooks’
Law within F/OSS development. This view is supported by a reductio ad absurdum
argument, claiming that, if Brooks’ Law were at work, it would not be possible to observe
6See also further on how, in the case of the GNU project, the failure to correctly modularize the architec-
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such a thing as Linux development. Conversely, the observation of the Linux case study
suggests to the author that the effects of Brooks’ Law may be overcome by other forces,
such as the project leader’s capabilities in attracting, motivating and coordinating a team
of skilled and talented developers, in a distributed process strongly facilitated by Internet
connectivity as a shared medium of communication. This argument, that Brooks’ Law
does not apply to Internet–based distributed development, has been widely criticized by
many authors (see for instance Bezroukov (1999); Jones (2000)).
Modularity allows us to reﬁne and clarify these criticisms suggesting that a large number
of participants in a project may be not a sufﬁcient condition to generate dysfunctional
effects such as diminishing or negative marginal return of manpower to productivity. The
key aspect, in this respect, is represented by the degree of task interdependency between
the various members belonging to the project. Thus, the high productivity experienced in
the GNU/Linux development is interpreted as largely due to the massively modularized
structure of the project, enabling the existence of highly independent sub–projects joined
by a limited number of developers, resembling in essence the theory of Brooks’ surgical
(small, skilled and focused) team (Brooks, 1975), while the role of the Internet in this
interpretation is of mere medium of exchange allowing distant communication.
Actually, our latest claim seems to be straightforward if we look at a typical sub–project
within the GNU/Linux architecture. Furthermore, if we look more generally at the world
of F/OSS projects, there is growing empirical evidence showing that the number of
participants involved in a project is on average very small (Krishnamurthy, 2002;
Capiluppi et al., 2003). Despite this, in some speciﬁc cases, such as in the development of
the kernel for the GNU operating system, that has been undertaken thanks to the
coordinated effort of hundreds of contributors, we need to clarify our point and to address
the relationships between Brooks’ Law and division of labor in the case of vertical
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Vertical division of labor and organization and architectural ladders
Another rather famous postulate in Raymond’s The Cathedral and the Bazaar is the
following:
“I had been preaching the UNIX gospel of small tools, rapid prototyping and evolutionary
programming for years. But I also believed there was a certain critical complexity above
which a more centralized, a priori approach was required. I believed that the most
important software (operating systems and really large tools like the Emacs programming
editor) needed to be built like cathedrals, carefully crafted by individual wizards or small
bands of mages working in splendid isolation, with no beta to be released before its time.
Linus Torvalds’s style of development – release early and often, delegate everything you
can, be open to the point of promiscuity – came as a surprise. No quiet, reverent
cathedral–building here – rather, the Linux community seemed to resemble a great
babbling bazaar of differing agendas and approaches (aptly symbolized by the Linux
archive sites, who’d take submissions from anyone) out of which a coherent and stable
system could seemingly emerge only by a succession of miracles.” (Raymond, 1999)7
While ﬁnding this quote intriguing and insightful in many senses, since it clearly describes
the evolutionary dynamics nature of GNU/Linux development (Kuwabara, 2000), we also
are convinced that it conveys many misleading interpretations of the F/OSS phenomenon
as a whole. Many authors have criticized the cathedral versus bazaar metaphor. We hereby
are particularly concerned with a serious and common misinterpretation of this metaphor
when it comes to the topic of the architectural characteristics of GNU/Linux.
The misinterpretation of the above quote runs, slightly simplifying, as follows:
GNU/Linux comes out of the blue from a chaotic mess of contributions and organizes
itself as a coherent system in an apparently self–regulating way, showing a mysteriously
spontaneous order. This emergent view of the genesis of GNU/Linux is misleading in that
it suggests the existence of a deregulated and emergent ﬂat architecture. In contrast, we
7See also Subsection 3.6 for related comments on these statements.MODULAR DESIGN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEX ARTIFACTS 18
claim that the modular architecture of GNU/Linux is characterized by being quite
hierarchical, rather than ﬂat.
Basically, it boils down to the distinct possibility of distinguishing at least two different
and hierarchically ordered ladders in GNU/Linux: a higher level, the kernel space, and a
lower one, the user space. As it happens, the celebrated babbling bazaar, representing the
decentralized and anarchic distributed process, takes place at the user level and it is
fostered by the highly modular architecture, as described formerly. Conversely, at the
higher inner level of the operating system, the development process seems to be rather
different: Linux inner core started to be developed as a one–person hack and only at a
subsequent stage of the process contribution from other developers were introduced.
Moreover, while contributions to the kernel represent an open process, the integration of
code within the kernel has been a process ﬁrmly regulated by the same Torvalds, at the
beginning, and later supported by a small group of “trusted lieutenants” (Franck and
Jungwirth, 2002; Dafermos, 2001). In the next Subsection this process will be described
in much more detail, here we are speciﬁcally concerned of describing its consequences at
the organizational level. In order to preserve integrity and coherence within the most
important and complex part of the system, at the kernel space ladder all initial relevant
design decisions were largely taken by Torvalds and by an inner team of developers. The
same holds for most of the subsequent activities of kernel development. While one has to
acknowledge the role of code contribution from the bottom (the hacker community), it is
also indisputable that its incorporation in the project has been fueled by a highly
structured and hierarchical process of review and selection (albeit not based on formal
authority but rather on competence and reputation).
Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) where the ﬁrst to highlight a basic feature of modular
product architectures, namely the isomorphic relationship between product architecture
and organization traits. This seems to be indeed the case for GNU/Linux that emerged as a
stable system not by a succession of miracles, but rather by exploiting modularity at theMODULAR DESIGN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEX ARTIFACTS 19
user space level, encouraging decentralization, and carefully crafting and controlling the
overall consistency of the design at the kernel space, imposing a cathedral–like hierarchy
in code evaluation and integration.
To summarize our point, we ﬁnd the cathedral vs. bazaar distinction seriously misleading.
Hence, if one really wants to compare the GNU/Linux architecture to a bazaar–like
structure, he should not look at an ordinary bazaar, but rather at Kapali Carsi, Istanbul
Grand Bazaar, the oldest (15th century) and largest (over 4400 shops on 30 hectares of
land) marketplace of the world. The most prominent and uncommon feature of this
marketplace is that it is not uncovered and out in the open as usually bazaars are. On the
contrary, it is a covered structure owning a complex architecture protecting a giant
labyrinth of shops and various commercial activities. It has been observed by many that
the covered architecture is a fairly regular structure, which makes the underlying bazaar
even more maze–like and confusing in practice. Just as the building architecture is not
affected by the underlying bazaar activities, likewise, GNU/Linux higher ladder, i.e. the
kernel, is largely shielded from decentralized evolutionary dynamics happening at the user
space level.
We have until now emphasized that the GNU operating system is a massive modular
architecture, mostly inherited from a previous design and characterized by a hierarchical
two–ladder architecture that hardly resembles the ﬂatness of the common bazaar at all. To
further reﬁne our analysis we need to admit that, albeit largely based on the UNIX
architecture, there does exist something truly innovative and original in the GNU operating
system. This pertains to its kernel. In the following Subsection we reﬂect on its origins,
highlighting the different approaches on modularity and interdependencies decomposition
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Ex–ante modularity versus evolving modularization: the development of a kernel for the
GNU operating system
Literature both in management and in computer science has clearly pointed out the pros
and cons of modular design and we have already discussed the undervalued difﬁculties
that designers face when they invent modular architectures for complex systems. Along
with Simon’s perspective, it has been shown that the decomposition of complex problems
in nearly–independent sub–problems (i.e. modules) is a complex activity itself (Marengo
et al., 2001). At the beginning, designers do not know precisely how to conceptualize the
modules of new artifacts; later, when a ﬁrst conceptualization is reached, they still vaguely
know how good is the chosen architecture, compared to the other that have not been
considered.
If we underestimate the problems posed by modules identiﬁcation and decomposition of
new architectures, we hardly understand why modular design of complex products is so
difﬁcult and unpredictable. Another way to grasp this issue is to consider that many
modular products were originally developed from interconnected solutions. While this is
not a general rule, it was deﬁnitely true for Linus Torvalds’s kernel: the GNU operating
system is known for being a modular complex artifact and its successful development,
accomplished by a distributed community of hackers, largely beneﬁted from that.
Therefore, it may be surprising that its core–component, the so–called kernel, was initially
conceived as a highly integrated product and only eventually acquired a modular structure.
As a developer, Linus Torvalds’ major effort to the project afterward called GNU/Linux
was aimed to conceive and write the kernel, that is the core part of the operative system
that could use all the applications and the libraries of software that had already beenMODULAR DESIGN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEX ARTIFACTS 21
developed within the GNU project.8
At the time Linus Torvalds started to work on his kernel, a long debate was mounting
around the advantages offered by an alternative architecture, called microkernel, designed
to work in all possible and different processors.9 Compared to traditional, hardware
dedicated kernels, microkernels appeared to be more complex and less efﬁcient. They
were more complex because even simple problems were treated as instances of general
tasks that might have involved a higher number of speciﬁcations and instructions to
interact with other parts of the kernel; therefore, they might have resulted to be less
efﬁcient as they did not take advantage of speciﬁc features of the hardware they run on.
While microkernel architecture appeared to be a better solution because of its recognized
technical superiority, Torvalds decided to develop his kernel in less general terms, thinking
that microkernels at the beginning of the ‘90 were still experimental and too complex
projects (at that time Microsoft was developing its new Windows NT using a microkernel
structure) and they were exhibiting a much worse performance (Torvalds, 1999). By the
way, when Torvalds started to work on its kernel the Free Software community and the
GNU partisans were already involved in the development of a microkernel (called
HURD), even though f the task seemed to be much far away from its conclusion.
Therefore, the very ﬁrst version of Linus’ kernel had a monolithic structure and was also
extremely hardware speciﬁc, since it was conceived for working on Intel 80386 processors
8By the time Torvalds started to conceive the Linux kernel, the GNU project had developed to the stage
of an almost complete free operating system, including all the major system components, such as terminals,
assemblers, compilers, interpreters, debuggers, text editors, mailers, and many more, but the fundamental
one: the kernel.
9As Torvalds put it “When I began to write the Linux kernel, there was an accepted school of thought
about how to write a portable system. The conventional wisdom was that you had to use a microkernel–style
architecture.” (Torvalds, 1999). See also the well–known “Linux is obsolete” ﬂamewar in the comp.os.minix
newsgroup (reported in Appendix A of DiBona et al. (1999)), where Linus Torvalds, Andrew Tanenbaum and
other relevant hackers passionately debated on OS design issues and on the strength and weakness of micro
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only. The ﬁrst effort to port Linux kernel to another processor (Motorola 68K) showed all
the drawbacks of having a hardware–speciﬁc architecture, since the developers of 68K
Linux had to write another hardware–speciﬁc kernel from scratch. When Torvalds started
to think about porting Linux to the Alpha platform, he realized that the original design
was no longer effective and in 1993 he started to rewrite the kernel code completely. He
decided to keep a monolithic architecture, but he introduced some degree of modularity in
the system design, in order to simplify the portability task and to incentive parallel
development in some less critical parts of the system. In Torvalds words:
“With the Linux kernel it became clear very quickly that we want to have a system which
is as modular as possible. The open–source development model really requires this,
because otherwise you can’t easily have people working in parallel. It’s too painful when
you have people working on the same part of the kernel and they clash.
Without modularity I would have to check every ﬁle that changed which would be a lot, to
make sure nothing was changed that would effect anything else. With modularity, when
someone sends me patches to do a new ﬁlesystem and I don’t necessarily trust the patches
per se, I can still trust the fact that if nobody’s using this ﬁlesystem, it’s not going to
impact anything else.”(Torvalds, 1999)
Therefore, the general kernel model made use of modules and it was conceived bearing in
mind those elements common to all typical modular architectures (even though it was not
as rigorous and general as microkernels are). Following this scheme, Torvalds could deal
with them separately and conﬁne all the hardware–speciﬁc pieces of code in modules out
of the core kernel (de Goyeneche and Apolinario Fern´ andez de Sousa, 1999). These
modules could be later updated or changed by Torvalds himself and by the other Linux
developers with no effect on the kernel core.10 Device drivers structure is a good example
of the third way followed by Torvalds. One extreme solution is to put all the hardware
10Version 2.1.110, released in July 1998, counts around 1,5 million lines of code: 29% is the kernel and
the ﬁle systems, 54% are platform–independent drivers and still 17% is architecture–speciﬁc code.MODULAR DESIGN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEX ARTIFACTS 23
speciﬁc into the core kernel: this is easier to do, it increased the performance, but the
kernel is totally unportable. The other extreme solution, consistent with the microkernel
design, urges to leave all the speciﬁc in the user space, which declines the performance
and the stability of the system.
In later discussions Torvalds explained the reasons for its choice: a fully modular
architecture, like the one adopted for HURD, would have posed problems to a degree of
complexity that it could have compromised the accomplishment of the project. To avoid
such risks and keep the degree of complexity of the project as low as possible, Torvalds
decided to design a monolith and he actually wrote all the architectural specs himself,11
avoiding all the problems related to collective projects (e.g. division of labor,
coordination, communication).
On the other hand, the HURD micro–kernel, a project in direct competition with the Linux
kernel, has paid for the choice of pursuing a fully modular approach from the beginning in
terms of the continuous delays that have plagued its development. Nowadays, it is still
under active development and still lacks the stability and performance assured by the
Linux kernel.
The validity of Torvalds choice is under our eyes and it is difﬁcult to overestimate the
consequences of this modular solution with regard to the subsequent portability and
extensibility of the system trough the distributed effort of the community. Nowadays
Linux run on an increasing number of computers, from workstations to handheld devices
and its development is assured by the effort of tens of thousands developers in the world.
Torvalds and a few other people close to him control the kernel core and have the ﬁnal
word in the decisions related to the development of the system. Other developers, on the
other hand, offer their contribution to improve and upgrade the system.
We already showed how critical were the consequences of inheriting a modular
UNIX–like architecture based on complementary and interconnected components. To a
11Releasing version 0.11 in December 1991, he credited on three other people.MODULAR DESIGN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEX ARTIFACTS 24
more hidden and critical level the development of the core of the operative system, the
kernel, followed an analogous destiny. The modular structure adopted by Torvalds for its
kernel happened to be successful, nevertheless it does not prevent the system from the
emergence of unforeseen interdependencies within the modules that may arise with the
future development of hardware and software. While HURD established itself as an
attempt to develop a fully general and modular system, Linux kernel took advantage of
some architectural shortcuts: as it is, the problem related to emergent interdependencies
that were not expected at the beginning may become a problem for the future enduring
success of Linux, even though this can be regarded as a future cost for the
straightforwardness of its design. Some of these emergent interdependencies may be
solved by tinkering, reworking and re–designing (Ratto, 2003); sometimes the adopted
solutions are not adequate and the communities of developers that do not agree with the
ﬁnal decision may introduce alternative versions of the system. These forks may express a
coordination failure when a community does not converge on a unique satisfying solution.
Further, unanticipated interdependencies may end up in more serious problems than just
forks, as it happens when the existing operative systems reveal itself to be inconsistent
with the architecture of new processors. Torvalds himself is fully aware of this situation
when he describes a future scenario of Linux’s decline:
“They’ll say Linux was designed for the 80386 and the new CPU’s are doing the really
interesting things differently. Let’s drop this old Linux stuff. This is essentially what I did
when creating Linux. And in the future, they’ll be able to look at our code, use our
interfaces, and provide binary compatibility, and if all that happens I’ll be
happy.”(Torvalds, 1999)
It is worthwhile to point out some observations that are suggested by this story:
• even when task partitioning and division of labor issues do not really matter, the design
of modular architectures from scratch may reveal to be an extremely complex task;
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• a modular architecture is more vulnerable to design faults, especially when the task is
complex and the amount of resources are limited; in particular, an ineffective deﬁnition of
modules that are not loosely–coupled enough produces an increasing amount of
interdependency, rather than its opposite. As a result, individuals, rather than groups of
developers may more efﬁciently accomplish the early stages of new projects. Some
successful F/OSS stories experienced this destiny, as they have been started as one-man
projects aimed to solve speciﬁc problems and eventually evolved in structured projects
involving a large number of people (e.g., Sendmail was initially developed by Eric Allman
to route email for other users within UC Berkely, Perl by Larry Wall to solve some
annoying problems in system administration, World Wide Web by Tim Berners-Lee as
group environment for academic information sharing among high-energy physicists, an so
on).
• Torvalds’ kernel story enriches the perspective offered by the Conway’s law about the
isomorphic structure of product and process (Conway, 1968). Modularity, in facts, seems
to be pursued not as a dogmatic feature of the product, but it arises as a general design rule
and it is boosted only when it provides some direct advantage. Therefore, the evolution of
the Linux kernel towards modular design suggests that it is possible to combine together,
under the same architecture, both modular components and integrated parts. Later on, the
designers may introduce a higher degree of modularity by adapting the originally
interconnected architecture. In other words, modularity arises more as a process of
evolutionary design (modularization), rather than as an ultimate ex–ante property of an
artifact.
Beyond the principles of modularity
In the previous Subsections, we have argued that the paradigm of modularity has a great
explanatory power in characterizing the F/OSS development style and the success of many
software projects: well–decomposed architectures seem to reconcile considerations about
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Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, for complex software artifacts it may be almost
impossible to separate ex-ante all interdependencies, and unforeseen coupling between
components at later stages (like for instance, integrating new and existing modules) may
strongly affect the ﬁnal outcome of the process. We argue that F/OSS development style
has originally adapted the principles of modularity in order to lower the impact of this
“dark side” of modularity.
It is worth mentioning that many scholars have radically criticized the modular approach
to the design of software artifacts since its introduction. As noted by Brooks (1995):
“Harlan Mills has argued pervasively that ‘programming should be a public process’, that
exposing all the work to everybody’s gaze helps quality control, both by peer pressure to
do things well and by peers actually spotting ﬂaws and bugs”.
Brooks argued that information should be completely available in order for failures in the
design of software to become evident and be corrected (Brooks, 1975). Conversely, in
accordance with the principles of modularity, these processes of peer review, control and
contribution to others’ source code are strongly limited by information hiding constraints,
since modules are not available to other developers.
Despite these criticisms, information hiding has nowadays become almost ubiquitous in
software engineering. Even Brooks (1995), in the 20th year anniversary edition of his The
Mythical Man–Month, admits the following: “Parnas was right, and I was wrong on
information hiding”.
We claim that the fundamental innovation of F/OSS practices lies in how the basic
postulate of information hiding is adapted to overcome these pitfalls, suggesting a step
further in the software engineering debate on the pros and cons of modularity. While
information hiding is clearly at the core of designers’ activities when initially
decomposing a software project in modules, the same principle is later disregarded, at the
implementation level, in day by day coding, test and integration activities. As a matter of
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from, a huge amount of code.
The free availability of the source and the absence of code ownership make programming
a truly public process, since good coding solutions are shared and adapted to solve similar
problems (Pavlicek, 2000), and ex–post interdependency conﬂicts are handled by
employing a wider set of ﬁne–tuning strategies. A well–known feature of F/OSS
methodologies is parallelized and distributed code debugging, where bugs are highlighted
and corrected by others’ “eyeballs” (Raymond, 1999; Iannacci, 2003). Kuan (2000), for
instance, shows that F/OSS has a higher rate of quality improvement than closed source
software. Similar results are obtained by Succi and Eberlein (2001). Jorgensen (2001)
reports that half of the respondents to his research survey claimed to have received a bug
report from someone else within the previous month and nearly half of them credited an
external contributor ﬁxing a bug in their code. Likewise, at the code review level, similar
parallel and distributed processes of peer review highlight design incoherencies
introduced by others.
In other circumstances the “no hiding” principle allows developers to undertake much
more sophisticated software engineering activities, such as redeﬁning modules and
interfaces speciﬁcations in response to the emergence of new interdependencies between
separate modules. This is often the case in the introduction of radically new or
substantially complex features in stable projects. For instance, the introduction of
cryptography in the Freenet project (von Krogh et al., 2003) affected many different
modules and demanded the whole redeﬁnition of the architecture. In the worlds of
developer #101:
“[...] unfortunately, any change you make in that affects not only the protocol, which is
what I am working on right now, but it affects how the keys are handled (Module 4), how
the client interprets the keys (Module 8), how data is veriﬁed. Basically, that little change
affects pretty much everything in Freenet and, therefore, the kind of people making those
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Freenet in order to do it.”
The availability of other modules source code is what allowed the two developers to
disentangle the complex web of interdependencies introduced by adding a public key to
cryptography. Similarly, Jorgensen (2001) underlines how the free ﬂow of information
about the whole project helped FreeBSD developers to introduce a radically innovative
feature to support multiprocessing (Symmetric Multiprocessing) within a mature software
architecture.
In short, the lesson of F/OSS development is the following: since it is impossible to design
ex–ante a zero–defect software architecture, it is worthwhile to embrace adaptive and
ﬂexible strategies that ease modules integration by using all the available (not anymore
hidden) information.
The no–hiding policy bears one additional consequence: it does not only elicit an iterative
and distributed process by which previously written code is ﬁne–tuned and optimized by
participants in the software community, but it also makes it possible for individual hackers
or entire groups to write patches or variations of the original code that are not completely
compatible with previous work carried out in the same software project or with respect to
other related pieces of software. While incompatibilities are most of the time
unintentional and marginal and may be ﬁxed by subsequent coding activities, sometimes
these modiﬁcations are large and/or intentional and may result in forking, i.e. the
introduction of an independent and partially incompatible version of the original software.
As a matter of fact, within the software industry, advocates of corporate closed source
software development have argued that, due to the lack of code ownership, F/OSS seems
to be particularly prone to develop “multiple incompatible versions of programs, [plagued
by] weakened interoperability, [and] product instability” (Mundie, 2001). With respect to
software development activities, this may lead to duplication of efforts and may result in
an inefﬁcient allocation of scarce resources at the level of the whole F/OSS community.
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frequent than one might expect at a ﬁrst glance, and may eventually lead to positive, rather
than catastrophic, outcomes. Many F/OSS projects have a governance structure (ranging
from the project leader benevolent dictatorship to the formation of complex coalitions)
that prevents attempts to fork (Kogut and Metiu, 2001). Moreover, the widespread
diffusion of the GNU General Public License (GPL), seems to mitigate the incentives to
fork an existing F/OSS project since, in essence, it prevents the appropriability of
innovations. In fact, while anyone may fork any software project at any time, his
subsequent work, due to the GPL “infectious” nature, would be available to the whole
community as well. Thus, others may take advantage of the improvements of the fork. In
this perspective, forking rarely happens and even when it occurs, this often translates in
being beneﬁcial to both competing projects, since the GPL allows each one to study the
other and implement the most innovative features (e.g. this seems to have been the case in
the rivalry between the Emacs and the XEmacs projects (Moen, 2003)). As a result,
forking seems to take place largely in case of ultimate and irreconcilable differences in
views and priorities in the development of a software project, and forks take off and
succeed only if they are able to occupy different ecological niches (see for instance the
existence of various GNU/Linux distributions), thus offering specialized solutions for a
differentiated audience (van Wendel de Joode et al., 2003). Finally, it has been noted that
it is not uncommon for forks to merge back with the original project as beneﬁts and
drawbacks of “running alone” may change overtime (as in the case, for instance, of the
egcs project, re–merged by the FSF with the original gcc project in 1999) (Moen, 2003).
Anyway this topic calls for more rigorous and analytic case studies aimed at understanding
better the advantages and drawbacks in the emergence of forking within F/OSS projects.
Discussion
In the end, modularity may be conceived as simple as it is, as long as we do not open the
black box and keep track of the organizational processes behind the structure. MostMODULAR DESIGN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEX ARTIFACTS 30
quoted contributions in management studies (Baldwin and Clark, 1997, 2000; Ulrich,
1995; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996) unfold a neat and smooth theory of modularity,
introduced as a cornerstone for artifact design.12 According to this Olympic version,
modularity is deﬁned as a “particular design structure, in which parameters and tasks are
interdependent within units (modules) and independent across them” (Baldwin and Clark
2000, p. 88). Unfortunately, this perspective underestimates that the decomposition of
complex systems generally resolves on a quasidecomposition and not in a full
decomposition, as some interdependencies may not be predicted or are left out on
purpose, simply because they are regarded as marginal ones. Our reconsideration of the
development of some F/OSS projects show how the modularity principles may in practice
differ from what the theory prescribes. GNU/Linux and, more generally, F/OSS represent
an instance of unorthodox modularity: the information hiding principle is signiﬁcantly
disregarded as the artifact evolves mainly through a repertoire of practices (e.g. peer
coding and debugging, frank discussions, open decisions) where developers and users
work apart, tinkering and patching the original modular product and, overall, violating
another of the law of the Olympic modularity stating that the only available operators are
represented by manipulation at the module level (splitting, substituting, augmenting,
excluding, inverting, porting, Baldwin and Clark (2000, pp. 123–146)).
In our view, reading the GNU/Linux case according to the modularity perspective
provides a complementary understanding of the F/OSS phenomenon and, at the same
time, offers some insights to think about the way we conceive a theory of modularity for
complex systems.
With respect to the ﬁrst issue, taking advantage of existing architectures like UNIX and
related standards (e.g. POSIX) it has been a successful strategy as the community of
developers avoided to design a modular structure from scratch. The comparison between
the HURD project and Torvalds monolithic kernel shows that to develop decomposable
12For an insightful assessment of this topic see also Langlois (2002) and Devetag and Zaninotto (2001).MODULAR DESIGN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEX ARTIFACTS 31
architectures for complex products exposes the designers to the risk of unforeseen
interdependencies that may ultimately endanger the whole project. Besides, as F/OSS
projects are developed by distributed organizations and the community members
communicate only remotely, coordination and collective decision making seem to be two
fundamental issues in F/OSS development. In other words, our study of F/OSS projects
through the lens of the theory of modularity outlines three main strategies that
characterize the design and the development of complex systems: i) inheriting existing
modular architecture, ii) evolving towards increasing degrees of modularity and iii)
violating the information hiding principle. This repertoire of practices, or shortcuts as we
called them in our introduction, emerge as effective and robust routines that seem to ﬁt
very well with the actors involved, i.e. distributed communities of developers, and the
problem solving activity they embrace.
GNU/Linux case, on the other hand, suggests some general reﬂections on modularity and
modularization. F/OSS developers exploit all the advantages of a modular architecture as
the massive parallel activity within modules/programs witnesses; on the other hand, the
modularization does not stop with the architecture design. The unforeseen
interdependencies that come to the surface as the operative system evolves, revealing
some inconsistencies, are met by violations of the information hiding principle.
In questioning how this experience may be extendible to other contexts where modularity
has already started to represent a promising approach, there are at least two fundamental
conditions that need to be clearly spelled out.
First, F/OSS distinctive trait is represented by the open access to knowledge (source code
and documentation) stored in the modules. In the F/OSS world, imitation and copy are
encouraged and protected by a reverse form of copyright (copyleft). According to the
Economics of Innovation standard models, copyleft should inhibit any investment in
innovations, since anybody may take advantage of any innovation and there are no
incentives for the innovators. F/OSS apparently contravenes this rule and this is wayMODULAR DESIGN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEX ARTIFACTS 32
motivational analyses based on various perspectives, i.e. psychological, cultural,
sociological, seem to be urgent to support an economic explanation of this phenomenon.
To our viewpoint, the apparent paradox of compelling innovations in a copyleft regime is
due to the second fundamental condition that characterizes the F/OSS movement, that is a
deep overlap between producers and users. At least, at the beginning, most users were
developers or had some skills that allowed them to perform successful adaptations. Again,
most of the traditional ways to conceive innovation and product development in other
domains keeps producers and users separated, even though today customers are more and
more often directly involved in the deﬁnition of their own product.
As long as developers and users communities deeply overlap, copyleft regime does not
inhibit innovation, but rather it ensures its open and free diffusion. On the other hand,
when the communities start to be more and more different from each other, when
developers are viewed as producers and users as customers, the natural system of
reciprocal beneﬁts becomes less and less salient. Therefore, looking for a possible
generalization of F/OSS experience should push us towards other economic contexts
where developers and users are able to establish strong relationships; in this respect,
settings where customers actively participate in the development of new products (see for
instance von Hippel (1998)) seem to represent a promising milieu for empirical
investigation.
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